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The increasingly polarised and fragmented party system in
Israel will make it difficult for a stable government to emerge
from this month’s elections.
Blog Admin
Israel’s next parliamentary elections are due to be held on 22 January. As part of EUROPP’s
coverage of the European neighbourhood, André Krouwel and Daniel Rajmil give an
overview of the country’s highly fragmented party system, noting that the results are likely to
be significantly different from those in the last election in 2009. New parties have emerged
in the last four years, while the largest party in the current parliament, Kadima, could well
lose all of its seats.
Of  all established democracies, Israel has the highest electoral change per election over
the post-war period. Only new democracies in Eastern Europe are more electorally
volatile. On average almost a quarter of  the Israeli electorate shif ts party allegiance per
election.
One of  the main reasons f or this exceptional electoral volatility is that Israeli elections
are held under a system of  proportional representation (PR). This means that many
polit ical parties will enter the f ray, as it is relatively easy to enter parliament compared to
majoritarian electoral systems. Parties will gain a number of  seats equal to the proportion of  the vote
they gained in the election, albeit that Israel has introduced a 2 per cent threshold to avoid too much
parliamentary f ragmentation. Nevertheless, over the last decade between 12 and 15 parties entered the
Knesset in each election. Few countries have such an open electoral system where the whole country is
one single constituency (in Europe only the Netherlands and Slovakia have adopted such a pure f orm of
PR), but the justif ication in the Israeli case was that the polit ical system needed to accommodate the
incoming immigrant population. Of  course, the other side of  the coin of  such f ragmentation is that
f orming a majority government and maintaining government stability is inf initely more dif f icult.
This high level of  volatility cannot be attributed solely to disloyal, party-switching voters. It is also the
polit ical establishment of  Israel that keeps changing the available party options. Frequently new parties
emerge, or they run in joint lists f or elections. Now – again in 2013 – the polit ical map of  Israel has
considerably changed, just as it did in 2009. For the upcoming Knesset elections on January 22, no less
than thirty- f our parties have entered the race and opinion polls predict that between 12 and 14 parties
will pass the 2 per cent threshold and make it into the Knesset.
Israel’s Polit ical Landscape
While many lines of  conf lict characterise Israeli polit ics, two deep social cleavages dominate. Like
elsewhere, parties can easily be aligned along a socio-economic lef t- right dimension. Widespread social
protest during the summer of  2011 showed that economic issues are still salient, regardless of  the geo-
polit ical situation of  the country.
Obviously, the second salient dimension arises out of  the continuing Arab-Israeli and Israeli-Palestinian
conf lict and related security issues. On all sides, Israel borders countries and territories that have
explosive or at best f ragile polit ical structures: Syria, Lebanon, the West Bank, Gaza and Egypt. Jordan
seems to be the only relatively stable neighbouring country. Add to this the constant threat of  terrorism
and the hostile posture of  Iran, and it becomes clear why security related issues capture the lion’s share
of  public attention in the country.
Clearly issues concerning territorial security are strongly associated with the religious-secular cleavage.
Those who are most religiously zealous on both sides of  the conf lict are also less inclined to support
territorial concessions. One of  the most visible parts of  this religious-territorial conf lict is settlement
construction on contested territories, particularly in East Jerusalem. On top of  that, many non-orthodox
Israelis resent the f act that the ultra-Orthodox and Arab populations do not serve in the military and are
exempt f rom taxation. These and many other contentious issues that relate to the secular-religious
divide derive f rom the strong religious inclinations of  the Jewish state.
Figure 1 illustrates the current polit ical landscape on a two dimensional plane, with each party’s posit ion
represented by their logo. The horizontal axis relates to the two major (and overlapping) cleavages in
contemporary Israel – security and religion. Secular parties and those with more conciliatory posit ions on
security (‘Doves’) are located on the lef t, with more religious and hard- line parties (‘Hawks’) located on
the right. This intersects with a vertical axis that represents policy posit ions on the economy, welf are,
human rights, law, and governability. For a f ull outline of  the calculations see electioncompass.org.
Figure 1: Israel’s Polit ical Landscape in 2013
 
Parties of the Right
  Likud  
  Yisrael Beiteinu  
HaBayit HaYehudi
Parties of the Centre
  Kadima   
  Yesh Atid   
  Hatnuah  
Parties of the Left
  Labor   
  Meretz     
Parties of the Religious-Right
  Shas     United Torah Judaism  
  Am Shalem    Otzma LeYisrael
Arab Parties
  Ra’am  
  Ta’al  
  Hadash  
  Balad
 
New party formations on the right confuse voters
When we look at the last three elections – as shown in Figure 2 – we see that the right-wing parties
remain the strongest party block. Yet there have been several attempts to unite the centre, f irst under
the Shinui banner and since 2006 with the f ormation of  Kadima. The lef t party block has been
considerably weakened by electoral losses.
Figure 2: Support for Israeli Parties in Parliamentary Elections (2003-2009)
On the right wing the main contender is the newly f ormed joint list of  the ruling party Likud and its
coalit ion partner Yisrael Beitenu. Recent opinion polls give them between 33 and 37 seats, which
compared to their current 42 seats means that these two governing parties stand to lose in the
upcoming election. Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu (Likud) and f ormer f oreign minister Avigdor
Lieberman (Israel Beytenu) are heading this joint list, a collaboration that is tainted since Lieberman f aces
charges of  breach of  trust and f raud.
This f ormation of  a joint list seems to conf use many f ormer Likud and Yisrael Beitenu voters on the
polit ical direction of  both parties. The losses predicted in the opinion polls are not surprising when we
consider that the two leaders Benjamin Netanyahu and Avidgor Lieberman represent vastly dif f erent
groups of  voters. While f or many Likud voters the coalit ion participation of  Lieberman was dif f icult to
swallow, a joint list may be a step too f ar.
Lieberman’s secular orientation, in particular, seems to worry prospective Likud voters. Historically,
electoral support f or Likud is drawn f rom tradit ionalist religious circles, which do not f eel at ease with
Lieberman’s policies. Likud Mizrahi voters have already made clear that they see a danger f or Israel’s
f uture with the secularisation of  the country. In addition, centrist voters that tradit ionally supported Likud
see in Lieberman an unwanted f orm of  extremism compared to the more diplomatic and tactical approach
of  Netanyahu. Yet the new f ormation seems to send out a conf using message of  hard- line opposition
towards territorial compromises with the Palestinians, while Netanyahu at the same time publicly voiced
support f or the establishment of  a Palestinian state under certain conditions.
More radical parties, like HaBayit  HaYehudi, that represent the more religious Z ionist right wing part of
society, may benef it f rom the Likud-Yisrael Beitenu merger and f rom the National Union split. This party
strongly supports the expansion of  Israeli settlements in Judea and Samaria, and holds conservative
views on issues of  religion, and state and civil rights. Also right-wing religious parties such as Otzma
LeYisrael f ormed by previously National Union members are polling between 1 and 3 seats, which means
that it will be increasingly dif f icult to reconcile the opposing views on territorial issues in the next
Knesset.
A weakened centre
Recent polls strongly suggest that Kadima, the largest party in the Knesset at present, will be totally
wiped of f  the polit ical map, af ter most of  its members def ected to other parties or lef t polit ics
altogether. In particular more centrist voters will be conf used with the f ormation of  a new party by Tzipi
Livni, Hatnuah. As leader of  Kadima, Livni was a powerf ul entity to be reckoned with, but af ter she was
ousted f rom the helm of  the party and it entered the right-wing nationalist Netanyahu government,
Kadima seems to have signed its own electoral death sentence. Shaul Mof az, the current leader of
Kadima, was essentially tricked into supporting Netanyahu, without any policy compensation, and he and
his party are paying the price f or his naiveté. Hatnuah now polls between 8 and 12 seats, nowhere near
the level of  support that Kadima was able to muster. Livni’s new f ormation advocates immediate renewal
of  negotiations with the Palestinians and pursuing the Peace Process, which will make a coalit ion with
the Netanyahu/Lieberman list problematic at best.
Moreover, the emergence of  another centrist party, Yesh Atid  has added more f ragmentation to the
polit ical centre. The voter base of  tradit ional parties seems to be undermined f urther due to the
appearance of  media f igures as polit ical leaders. Yesh Atid’s leader, the news anchor and media star Yair
Lapid, exemplif ies this development. Lapid’s supporters seem attracted to his ‘catch-all strategy’ with
ref erences to both lef t-wing and right-wing polit ical concerns while claiming to be the most attractive
centrist party. He advocates military service f or all cit izens, ‘improvement’ of  the education system, and
‘ref orming’ the electoral system. He has used his media popularity to crit icise both the polit ical system as
well as Netanyahu’s socio-economic policies, which resonates particularly well among discontented
middle class voters.
The fragile left
This f ragile party context will not only conf use right-wing and centrist voters. The lef t-wing opposition is
in even more disarray. Labor is seeking to f ind a new or renewed identity af ter Ehud Barak lef t the party
in shatters. Now led by Shelly Yachimovich, the party is polling 16 to 20 seats, yet this is a f ar cry f rom
their predominance of  Israeli polit ics up to the mid-1970s. Labor has not yet reaped the rewards of  vast
social discontent at the current government’s perf ormance. While many voters showed their
social discontent at the current government’s perf ormance. While many voters showed their
dissatisf action with the austerity measures of  the Netanyahu administration, social movements captured
the protests just like in other parts of  the world. The polit ical lef t seems unable to capitalise on the
widespread impoverishment of  the working and middle classes and the retrenchment of  the welf are
state.
Labor leader Shelly Yachimovich has sent conf using messages, sometimes addressing the dire
socioeconomic situation of  many Israeli voters, but at the same time playing down the socialist tradit ions
of  the party. She may f ace a hard time convincing tradit ional voters to trust Labor again af ter Barak’s
entry into the Netanyahu government af ter the last election. This widespread distrust of  Labor may be
one of  the reasons why Yachimovich has shif ted her electoral strategy in the middle of  the campaign and
publicly announced that she will either be the next prime-minister or will be in the opposition block,
distancing herself  f rom any possible association with a f uture Netanyahu government.
Lef t-wing parties are conf licted over where to move on the security issues and the settlements. Labor
seems happy to ignore the geopolit ical environment of  Israel in their party platf orm, rather than
developing an alternative to the Netanyahu-Lieberman strategy. In addition, there seems to be litt le
agreement on security issues between the broader progressive lef t of  Labor, Meretz and the Arab
parties (Hadash, Ra’am, Ta’al, and Balad).
Meretz, currently at 3 seats, stands to gain one or two seats, still not making it a relevant party f or
government f ormation. This lef t-wing Z ionist party puts a strong emphasis on human and civil rights, the
separation of  state and religion, social justice, and has a conciliatory approach to territorial questions.
Meretz is one of  the f ew parties which seems willing to compromise on the Palestinian territories and the
Golan Heights in exchange f or peace.
Stability on the orthodox- religious right
One stable f actor of  Israeli polit ics stems f rom the ultra-orthodox religious-nationalist parties. Under
leader Eli Yishai, Shas seems to hold on to their support. They may even gain some momentum if
dissatisf ied religious Likud voters decide that they are a saf er bet than Netanyahu’s adventure with
Lieberman. Shas, which represents the ultra-Orthodox Sephardi and Traditional sections of  Israeli
society, currently polls between 10 and 13 seats. It is a highly clientelist party that is capable of  providing
high levels of  monetary transf ers to their voters due to their ‘blackmail’ potential in coalit ion f ormation.
Similarly, parties such as the religious moderate Am Shalem can enter the Knesset, as well as the f ar-
right Habeit  HaYehudi and Otzma LeYisrael, who may be able to syphon of f  votes f rom the new Likud
combination by emphasising nationalist-religious stances, such as support f or settlements in occupied
territories.
Most ultraorthodox voters will likely remain loyal to United Torah Judaism, the tradit ional Haredi party
that historically attracts a more social f ollowing than Likud and Shas. The party, which now polls around
5 to 6 seats, is a combined list of  two Ashkenazi ultra-Orthodox parties. It f ollows the spirit of  the Torah
and tradit ional Judaism and calls f or the unif ication of  the People of  Israel and the Land of  Israel under
Jewish religious law. Some view the ultra-Orthodox parties as part of  the right-wing bloc, due to their
tendency to join rightist coalit ions and in light of  the hawkish tendencies of  their voters. However, the
ultra-Orthodox parties have also participated in coalit ions headed by lef t ist or centrist parties in the past.
Entrenched Arab parties
While parties that represent the Arab speaking Israelis have a stable and loyal f ollowing, they matter lit t le
to government and policy f ormation. Hadash now polls roughly the same number of  seats they currently
have (4 seats). Their ideology is more or less socialist in its orientation, and the movement incorporates
the f ormer Israeli Communist Party. While it def ines itself  as a bi-national Jewish-Arab party, it mainly
attracts the Arab vote. Hadash f avours the establishment of  a Palestinian state, equal rights f or all
Israeli cit izens, Arabs and Jews alike, and an equitable distribution of  national wealth.
The second largest Arab party is Ra’am-Ta’al, currently at 4 seats. This is a joint list made up of  the
Islamist Ra’am (United Arab List) and the secular Ta’al (Arab Movement f or Renewal). It supports the
establishment of  a Palestinian state, with East Jerusalem as its capital, and af f irmative action to reduce
the disparit ies between the Arab and Jewish populations. Finally, Balad is a small party which currently
holds 3 seats and def ines itself  as a Palestinian patriotic Arab nationalist party. Its polit ical goals
highlight the principle of  “a state of  all its cit izens” and of f icial recognition of  the Arab minority as a
national minority with individual and collective rights.
Uncertain electoral shifts and polit ical instability
What can we expect in the upcoming elections? If  we look at the past three elections of  2003, 2006 and
2009, there were high levels of  vote transf ers between Likud, Kadima and the Labor party. Already in 2003
we saw a substantial shif t towards the right-wing and centrist parties, at the expense of  the tradit ional
lef t-wing parties. Labor has been gradually weakened since 2003.
The emergence of  new centrist movements also weakened the tradit ional representative of  the right,
Likud. The party lost almost ten per cent of  its support between 2003 and 2009. Also the emergence of
the nationalist right-wing Yisrael Beytenu in 2006 has weakened Likud. It seems that Likud has made the
calculation that it cannot beat Lieberman’s party, so they opted to join his polit ical project. Our data show
that this strategy is alienating tradit ional Likud voters.
The tradit ional electoral logic in Israel was shattered with the emergence of  Kadima in 2006. The party
was f ounded by then prime minister Ariel Sharon as a split f rom Likud. In his attempt to monopolise the
polit ical centre in Israel – the party indeed incorporated both important Labor and Likud polit icians –
Sharon destroyed the centripetal tendencies within Likud. With the collapse of  Kadima, it is unclear where
centrist voters are most likely to shif t.
Will these voters shif t to the new centrist options Livni’s Hatnuah or Lapid’s Yesh Atid, support
Yachimovich’s ‘New’ Labor, or will they jump on the Netanyahu/Lieberman tandem? Livni, Lapid and
Yachimovich are allegedly discussing collaboration to f orm an alternative to a new Nethanyahu
government, but Lapid seems unwilling to commit and totally rule out participation in a centre-right
government.
Whatever the shif ts and tactical moves of  the polit ical elite, a more f ragmented party system is the most
likely outcome of  the elections in two weeks time. The polit ical skills of  the party leaders will be tested in
f orming the next government. They need to bridge an increasingly polarised and f ragmented polit ical
landscape. With all the instability in the surrounding countries and the wider region, an unstable Israeli
government is a worrying prospect.
Please read our comments policy before commenting.
Note:  This article gives the views of the author, and not the position of EUROPP – European Politics and
Policy, nor of the London School of Economics.
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